Co-Financing Agreements and Reciprocity: When 'No Deal' is a Good Deal by Jang, Dooseok et al.
Co-Financing Agreements and Reciprocity:
When ‘No Deal’ is a Good Deal∗
Dooseok Jang†, Amrish Patel‡and Martin Dufwenberg§
November 9, 2016
Abstract
Institutions for co-financing agreements often exist to encourage
public good investment. Can such frameworks deliver maximal in-
vestment when agents are motivated by reciprocity? We demonstrate
that indeed they can, but not in the way one might expect. If max-
imal investment is impossible in the absence of the institution and
public good returns are high, then an agreement signed by all par-
ties cannot lead to full investment. However, if all parties reject the
co-financing agreement, then an informal deal to invest can lead to
full investment. Agreement institutions may thus do more than just
facilitate the signing of formal agreements; they may play a critical
role in igniting informal cooperation underpinned by reciprocity.
Keywords: Co-financing agreements, informal agreements, public goods,
reciprocity.
JEL codes: C72, D03, F53, H41
∗This paper extends and replaces Jang (2015). We thank Scott Barrett, Oana Bor-
can, Gautam Gowrisankaran, B˚ard Harstad, Doruk Iris, Kiryl Khalmetski, Georg Kirch-
steiger, Ashley Langer, Derek Lemoine, David Reinstein, Stanley Reynolds, Alexander
Sebald, Mark Stegeman and numerous seminar audiences for useful comments or discus-
sions. Funding is gratefully acknowledged from the Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius
Foundation (P2012-0097-1).
†Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology; jangds@kaist.ac.kr
‡University of East Anglia; amrish.patel@uea.ac.uk
§University of Arizona, University of Gothenburg, CESifo; martind@eller.arizona.edu
1
1 Introduction
Institutions play an important role in creating the conditions for investment
in public goods. Among other things, they facilitate the negotiation and
enforcement of binding agreements. One common type of agreement is a
co-financing, or cost-sharing, agreement; signatories make a binding commit-
ment to co-finance each other’s future public good investments. The agree-
ment does not commit a signatory to invest in public goods per se. However,
should any signatory initiate a public good investment, its co-signatories are
committed to share the cost. Such agreements have been used to finance crit-
ical investment in public goods, ranging from disease eradication to climate
change mitigation.1
Theoretically, co-financing agreements can increase public good invest-
ment (cf. Varian 1994).2 This is because a signatory can be pivotal in
inducing other signatories to invest in public goods, as only with its par-
ticipation would the private cost of a public good be less than the private
benefit. However, full investment remains impossible as if there are many
signatories, an individual signatory is no longer pivotal, thus it deviates to
not signing and not investing.
These insights rely on the assumption that agents care only about their
material payoffs. Yet behaviour in public good contexts often exhibits condi-
tional cooperation (e.g. Fischbacher et al. 2001), cooperating only if others
do. Such behaviour can be rationalised using reciprocity theory (Rabin 1993,
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004 (D&K), Falk and Fischbacher 2006). It
describes agents as having a desire to be kind to those who are kind to them,
and unkind to those who are unkind to them. For example, if agent A invests,
agent B may view A as kind and invest himself.
The implications of reciprocity for public good provision are both well
established (e.g. Sugden 1984) and straightforward. If agents care enough
1In April 2016 The World Bank and The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
signed a co-financing agreement focusing on water, transport and energy. Each
party contributed $216 million to the first project, upgrading slums in Indone-
sia: www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2016/06/world-bank-and-aiib-signs-joint-co-financing-
agreement. Such agreements are also signed by private companies. The Asian Devel-
opment Bank, for instance, has an agreement with Chevron to invest in IT, construction
and engineering education: www.adb.org/site/cofinancing/partners. One area where cost-
sharing agreements are extensively used is in R&D investments (Katz 1986).
2Indeed higher investment is observed in related experimental games (Andreoni and
Varian 1999, Falkinger et al. 2000 and Charness et al. 2007.)
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about reciprocity, maximal investment is possible, otherwise it is not. By
contrast, little is known about the implications of reciprocity for agreements
over public goods.
An obvious question follows: How do co-financing agreements perform
under reciprocity? More specifically, one may wonder: Can a co-financing
mechanism deliver full investment? Does such investment follow if all players
sign the agreement? Is it impossible if no-one signs the agreement? To answer
these questions, we apply D&K’s model of reciprocity to an agreements game
where players choose whether or not to sign a cost-sharing agreement, then
play a public good game. We find that if full investment was impossible
with no mechanism and the public good return is high, then such investment
remains impossible if all players sign. However, full investment is attainable
if all players reject the agreement so that no-one signs.
For some intuition, consider the interaction of kindness and co-financing
agreements. Roughly, D&K say that agent i is kind to agent j if i could have
given j a much lower payoff by changing his behaviour. Agent i deviating
from a situation where all players sign and invest does reduce j’s payoff, but
not by much, as the cost-sharing agreement still has many signatories thus
provides large investment incentives. By contrast, if i deviates from a situa-
tion where no-one signs and all invest, j’s payoff is reduced considerably as
there is no such cost-sharing agreement. Kindness and hence reciprocity in-
centives to invest in public goods are thus larger when there are no signatories
than when there are many.
Our results provide several important insights. First, the existence of an
institution for making binding agreements is potentially critical for cooper-
ation, even if an agreement is not actually signed. Second, while easy to
overlook, agreements that are not signed may be the reason why we observe
as many public goods as we do. Third, informal agreements, which in our
model could be a legitimate interpretation of the “no-one signs but all invest
anyway” outcome, may be able to achieve outcomes that formal agreements
cannot. Fourth, and pointing to the more general feature underlying the pre-
vious insights, prior stages in games (here, an agreement stage) can increase
a player’s influence over others’ payoffs, since others may condition their ac-
tions on his early choice. This increase in payoff influence, can “amplify”
psychological payoffs (in our case kindness) and make otherwise impossible
outcomes attainable.
We add to an active literature studying agreements (e.g. Barrett 2003,
Harstad 2012, 2015, Battaglini and Harstad 2016, Martimort and Sand-
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Zantman 2016) and an emerging literature on mechanism design where play-
ers have reciprocity preferences (Netzer and Volk 2014, Bierbrauer et al.
2015, Bierbrauer and Netzer 2016, Dufwenberg and Patel 2016).
Our particular mechanism, cost-sharing agreements, falls into a class of
mechanisms where commitments on strategy-conditional side-payments are
made before a game is played (Jackson and Wilkie 2005, Ellingsen and Palt-
seva 2016). Cost-sharing is an important case of models where agents make
commitments to match others’ public good investments (Guttman 1978,
1987, Boadway et al. 2007) or to compensate others for their investment
(Varian 1994). Our game may also be relevant for agreements on R&D in-
vestment (Katz 1986) and International Environmental Agreements (IEAs)
(Barrett 1994), if they involve binding co-financing.
Understanding the role of reciprocity in IEAs is important for environ-
mental economists. Nyborg (2015) concurrently developed a model that ex-
tends D&K to cooperative games in order to apply it to Barrett’s IEAs model.
She finds that reciprocity can create weakly larger stable coalitions that ex-
hibit higher abatement. Less closely related are Hadjiyiannis et al. (2012)
and Kolstad (2014). The former studies the effect of a different notion of
reciprocity on abatement in a two-player game with no possibility to sign an
agreement. The latter examines the effect of equity- and efficiency-concerns
(Charness and Rabin 2000) in an IEAs game.
We structure the paper as follows. Section 2 presents a set of preliminaries
needed for our main result. Section 3 presents our main result on how full
investment is impossible if all players sign, but is possible if no-one signs.
Section 4 offers some further results before we conclude in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
We introduce a public good game (2.1), an agreements game (2.2), and
D&K’s reciprocity model (2.3) which we apply to the public good game (2.4).
2.1 The public good game (ΓP)
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of players where n ≥ 4.3 Each i ∈ N simul-
taneously chooses ai ∈ {0, 1}, where 1 corresponds to investing in a public
3We discuss n < 4 in Section 4.
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good and 0 to not doing so. Let a = (ai)i∈N . Player i’s material payoff is
pii (a) = β
∑
j∈N
aj − γai,
where β is the public good benefit and γ the cost. Assume that nβ > γ >
β > 0 so that the individual cost exceeds the benefit and all players investing
maximises total payoffs. ΓP has a unique NE where for all i ∈ N , ai = 0.
2.2 The agreements game (ΓA)
The agreements game appends a prior stage to the public good game where
each player decides whether to sign a co-financing agreement: a binding
commitment to share public good investment costs.
As before, N = {1, . . . , n}, n ≥ 4. In stage 1, the “sign-up stage”, each
i ∈ N simultaneously chooses a1i ∈ {0, 1}; 1 means signing the agreement, 0
not doing so. In stage 2, the “investment stage”, each i ∈ N simultaneously
chooses a2i ∈ {0, 1}; 1 means investing in the public good, 0 not doing so.
Let a1 = (a1i )i∈N , a
2 = (a2i )i∈N and a = (a
1, a2).
Let m(a1) =
∑
i∈N a
1
i be the number of signatories, x(a
2) =
∑
i∈N a
2
i the
number of players who invest, xm(a) =
∑
i∈N a
1
i a
2
i the number of signatories
who invest. Player i’s material payoff is
pii (a) =
{
βx (a2)− γa2i if a1i = 0
βx (a2)− γ xm(a)
m(a1)
if a1i = 1
,
where β is the public good benefit and γ the cost. The investment stage
involves the same decision as in ΓP , but with different payoff consequences
for signatories. Signatories have made a binding commitment to share their
investment costs. As before, nβ > γ > β > 0 and to avoid knife-edge cases,
assume γ
β
is non-integer and n >
⌈
γ
β
⌉
.4 A strategy for i, si ∈ Si, specifies
an initial choice and a choice for each stage 1 history. We focus on pure
strategies throughout. Finally, let S = ×i∈NSi and s ∈ S.
The following observation highlights important properties of SPE of ΓA.
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⌈
γ
β
⌉
is the lowest integer strictly greater than γβ .
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Observation 1 (Agreements game SPE)
(a) There does not exist a full investment SPE in ΓA.
(b) There exist zero investment SPE in ΓAwith [0,
⌈
γ
β
⌉− 1) signatories.
(c) There exist positive investment SPE in ΓA with
⌈
γ
β
⌉
signatories.
Our proofs are rather tedious. We provide them in the appendix. In the main
text we highlight key intuitions. In the case of Observation 1, to understand
why SPE exhibit less than full investment, solve backwards. Non-signatories
never invest as they bear their full investment cost. A signatory only invests if
his costs are shared with sufficiently many co-signatories, namely if m(a1) ≥⌈
γ
β
⌉
. Given this, consider the sign-up stage. There exist SPE with very few
signatories, (b), as stage 1 deviation does not induce investment. There also
exist SPE with
⌈
γ
β
⌉
signatories, (c), as each signatory is pivotal in inducing all
signatories to invest. If there are greater than
⌈
γ
β
⌉
signatories, a signatory can
increase his payoff by deviating to not signing as other signatories continue
to invest, hence full investment is not SPE, (a).
Observation 1 echoes the results of Varian (1994) and Barrett (1994).5
2.3 Modelling reciprocity
We now incorporate reciprocity following D&K.6 Their approach uses “kind-
ness functions”. To determine whether i is kind to j one needs a reference
point, the equitable payoff. In defining this reference point, D&K argue that
only the set of efficient strategies, Ei, those not involving “wasteful” play,
are relevant.7 For ΓP , Ei = Si; for ΓA, si /∈ Ei iff si prescribes not investing
after a history of i signing and m (a1) ≥ ⌈γ
β
⌉
.
Let bik ∈ Sk denote i’s (point) belief of k’s strategy, then given (bik)k 6=i
the equitable payoff for j is the average of the most i believes he can “give”
5Both authors suggest mechanisms that give some SPE with partial investment and
some with zero investment.
6Our presentation is tailored to ΓP and ΓA; see D&K for general games.
7A strategy is efficient if there does not exist another strategy which for all histories
and others’ strategies gives no player a lower payoff, and for some history and others’
strategies gives at least one player a strictly higher payoff. See D&K pp. 275-6 for more
on motivation, and the precise definition for general games.
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to j given his strategy set and the least he believes he can “give” given his
efficient strategies:
pieij
(
(bik)k 6=i
)
= 1
2
[
max{pij
(
si, (bik)k 6=i
)
|si ∈ Si}+ min{pij
(
si, (bik)k 6=i
)
|si ∈ Ei}
]
.
To define i’s kindness to j, let si (h) be i’s (updated) strategy which
is identical to si except that a
1
i must be consistent with reaching h. Let
bik (h) be i’s (updated) belief of k’s strategy. Given si (h) and (bik (h))k 6=i, i’s
kindness to j at h is
κij
(
si (h) , (bik (h))k 6=i
)
= pij
(
si (h) , (bik (h))k 6=i
)
− pieij
(
(bik (h))k 6=i
)
.
The material payoff i believes j receives (first term on RHS) is compared to
the equitable payoff (second term on RHS). If κij (.) > 0, i is kind to j. If
κij (.) < 0, i is unkind to j. If κij (.) = 0, i has zero kindness toward j.
To capture reciprocity incentives D&K need a function reflecting how
kind i perceives j as being. Let cijk (h) denote i’s updated (point) belief
about j’s (point) belief about k’s strategy. Given bij (h) and (cijk (h))k 6=j, i’s
perceived kindness of j towards i at history h is
λiji
(
bij (h) , (cijk (h))k 6=j
)
= pii
(
bij (h) , (cijk (h))k 6=j
)
− piejj
(
(cijk (h))k 6=j
)
.
The material payoff that i believes j believes i receives (first term on RHS) is
compared to the equitable payoff (second term on RHS). If λiji (.) > 0 then
i perceives j as kind to him, etc.
Player i ’s utility at history h sums material and reciprocity payoffs
Ui
(
si (h) ,
(
bik (h) , (cikl (h))l 6=k
)
k 6=i
)
= pii
(
si (h) , (bik (h))k 6=i
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
material payoff
(1)
+ Y
∑
j∈N\{i}
(
κij
(
si (h) , (bik (h))k 6=i
)
· λiji
(
bij (h) , (cijl (h))l 6=j
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
reciprocity payoff
,
where Y ≥ 0 is the sensitivity to reciprocity payoffs. If Y > 0 then i’s
preference for reciprocation toward j is captured by i’s utility increasing
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when κij (.) and λiji (.) are non-zero with matching signs, reflecting mutual
kindness or unkindness.
Let Γ̂P and Γ̂A denote the public good game and agreements game where
players’ utilities are (1).8 To define an appropriate solution concept, let s′i (h)
be the strategy identical to si (h) at all histories except at h, where it differs
(given binary action choices there is only one such strategy).
Definition 1 s ∈ S is a sequential reciprocity equilibrium (SRE) if for all i
and at each history h it holds that
(i) Ui
(
si (h) ,
(
bik (h) , (cikl (h))l 6=k
)
k 6=i
)
≥ Ui
(
s′i (h) ,
(
bik (h) , (cikl (h))l 6=k
)
k 6=i
)
,
(ii) cijk = bjk = sk for all j 6= i and k 6= j.
Condition (i) implies i best-responds at each history given his beliefs. Con-
dition (ii) requires beliefs to be correct. If Y = 0 then Definition 1 describes
a SPE (+ correct beliefs) in a game where utility equals material payoffs.
2.4 Reciprocity in the public good game
Full investment was impossible in ΓP (2.1). Can it be a SRE in Γ̂P ? If
so, given equilibrium beliefs, for all i, j ∈ N , κij (1, .) = λiji (1, .) = β2
and κij (0, .) = −β2 . Therefore i would not deviate to not investing if
nβ − γ + (n− 1)Y (β
2
)2 ≥ (n− 1) β + (n− 1)Y (−β
2
)(β
2
). Put differently,
full investment is a SRE of Γ̂P if Y ≥ Y ∗, where
Y ∗ =
2 (γ − β)
β2 (n− 1) .
Intuitively, a sufficiently high reciprocity sensitivity ensures that the reci-
procity cost of deviating to not investing (being unkind to co-players who
are kind to you) outweighs the material gain. Our main result, in the next
section, concerns whether the agreements mechanism (Γ̂A) can deliver full
investment where it is impossible in Γ̂P , i.e. Y < Y
∗.
8Γ̂P and Γ̂A are psychological games (Geanakoplos et al. 1989, Battigalli and Dufwen-
berg 2009).
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3 Main result
Can the agreements game deliver full investment if this is impossible without
the agreements mechanism (Y < Y ∗) and the stakes are high (large β)? In-
deed it can, but not how one might expect. If all players sign, full investment
remains out of reach; however, if no-one signs, full investment is possible!
We first state the result formally (3.1), then provide intuition via examples
(3.2-3).
3.1 Formal statement
Theorem 1 For all γ > 0 and n ≥ 4, there exists β′ ∈ (0, γ) and Y ′ ∈
(0, Y ∗) such that,
(a) if β ≥ β′ and Y < Y ∗, there does not exist a full investment SRE in
Γ̂A with n signatories,
(b) if β ≥ β′ and Y ∈ [Y ′, Y ∗), there exists a full investment SRE in
Γ̂A with 0 signatories. The SRE is described by 0 signing, then non-
signatories investing iff there are 0 signatories and signatories investing
if there are at least
⌈
γ
β
⌉
signatories.
The theorem suggests that for high return public goods where full invest-
ment is impossible, the introduction of an agreements mechanism makes full
investment possible. Encouraging all players to actually sign however is coun-
terproductive. Instead, it is potentially a good thing if all parties walk away
from the negotiating table.
The strategies that support the full investment result – part (b) of the
theorem – may seem to require a deep understanding of the game by the
players. If a player deviates in stage 1 by signing, then no players invest in
stage 2. So a deviation in stage 1 would result in a large decrease in material
payoff for all players, and (as we show below) this is central for incentive-
compatibility. Of course, this requires that all players understand the full
consequences of varying degrees of take-up of the agreement, which may seem
a tall order. However, on one interpretation, the equilibrium may reflect an
informal agreement, where coordination is achieved through discussions. We
return to and elaborate on that perspective later on (Section 5, Insight #2).
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3.2 Highlighting the intuition: part (b)
We begin with part (b) of Theorem 1 as it is more straightforward. Example
1 takes the stated profile, where no-one signs and all invest on path, and
shows that it is a SRE for an interval of Y less than Y ∗.
Example 1 (No-one signs): Take Γ̂A and let n = 4, γ = 10, β = 9 and
Y ∈ [ 1
351
, Y ∗), where Y ∗ = 2
243
. Consider the profile where,
• no-one signs,
• non-signatories invest iff there are 0 signatories,
• signatories invest iff there are at least 2 signatories.
Reason as follows to see that the profile is a SRE. Following a history of 0
signatories, i does not deviate to not investing if
4 · 9− 10 + 3Y · (26− 1
2
(26 + 0)
) · (26− 1
2
(26 + 0)
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
λiji(.)
≥ 3 · 9 + 3Y · (17− 1
2
(26 + 0)
) · (26− 1
2
(26 + 0)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
λiji(.)
. (2)
Solving gives Y ≥ 1
351
, note that 1
351
< Y ∗ = 2
243
.
Following a history of 1 signatory, i does not deviate to investing for any
Y . Following a history of 2 signatories, signatory i does not deviate to not
investing if Y ≤ 4
157
, note that Y ∗ = 2
243
< 4
157
. Following histories of 2
or 3 signatories, non-signatory i does not deviate to investing if Y ≤ Y ∗.
Following a history of 3 or 4 signatories, signatory i does not deviate to not
investing for any Y . Player i does not deviate to signing in the sign-up stage
for any Y . The profile is thus a SRE for Y ∈ [ 1
351
, Y ∗). N
Kindness amplification
Why do players invest after no-one signs (Example 1), when they would not
have invested if there had been no option to sign (Γ̂P with Y < Y
∗)? The
explanation centers on what we call kindness amplification.
To see this, contrast the 0 signatory subgame in Example 1 with the full
investment profile in Γ̂P . In both cases, i has the same material incentive to
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deviate to not investing: a material payoff increase of 3·9−(4·9−10) = 1. His
reciprocity incentive however differs as kindness is higher (or amplified) in
Example 1 (e.g. λiji (.) =
9
2
in Γ̂P , see section 2.4, but λiji (.) = 13 in Example
1, see (2)). The amplified kindness implies that for a given Y , the decrease in
i’s reciprocity payoff from deviating to not investing is larger in Example 1
(3Y ·13 ·13−3Y ·4 ·13 = 351Y ) than in Γ̂P (3Y (92)(92)−3Y (−92)(92) = 2432 Y ).
A lower Y is thus sufficient to prevent i deviating in Example 1 than in Γ̂P ,
hence our result.
The fundamental reason as to why the agreements mechanism can am-
plify kindness is that it can increase a player’s ability to influence others’
behaviour. For instance, if j signs in Example 1, no-one invests, implying
i’s material payoff falls by 4 · 9 − 10 = 26. If j deviates to not investing in
Γ̂P , others’ actions are unchanged so i ’s material payoff falls by only 9 < 26.
Thus i perceives j as kinder in Example 1 than in Γ̂P .
3.3 Highlighting the intuition: part (a)
We now illustrate part (a) of Theorem 1. Example 2 has three parts, it takes
the parameters of Example 1 and demonstrates that for Y < Y ∗, no profile
where all players sign and invest on path is a SRE. The key intuition is that
kindness cannot be amplified as effectively as when there are zero signatories
on path (3.2). Part (i) demonstrates that a particular off-path investment-
stage behaviour implies sign-up stage deviation. Parts (ii) and (iii) show
that while alternative off-path investment-stage behaviours may avoid sign-
up stage deviation, they necessarily involve investment-stage deviation.
Example 2(i) (Sign-up stage deviation): Take Γ̂A and let n = 4, γ = 10,
β = 9 and Y < Y ∗ = 2
243
. Consider any profile where
• all players sign & invest on path,
• only signatories invest if there are 3 signatories.
Player i’s sign-up stage incentives are identical to those for the full investment
profile in Γ̂P , i thus deviates to not signing as Y < Y
∗. N
It follows from Example 2(i) that all remaining candidate SRE (where all
players sign and invest on path) must involve: (a) a signatory who does not
invest when there are 3 signatories, or, (b) a non-signatory who invests when
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there are 3 signatories. Examples 2(ii) and 2(iii) rule out candidate SRE with
properties (a) and (b) respectively by demonstrating that players deviate in
the investment stage.
Example 2(ii) (Signatory not investing with 3 signatories): Take Γ̂A
and let n = 4, γ = 10, β = 9 and Y < Y ∗ = 2
243
. Consider a profile where
• all players sign & invest on path,
• at history h where there are 3 signatories, some signatory i does not
invest.
By deviating to investing at h, signatory i can increase his material payoff
by 9− 10
3
= 17
3
. Can i’s reciprocity incentives prevent this deviation? Since i
not investing is less kind than investing, to maximise the reciprocity cost of
i’s deviation examine the profile where
• all players sign & invest on path,
• no-one invests if there are 3 signatories,
• all players invest if there are 2 signatories.
Player i’s reduction in reciprocity payoff from deviation at h is then 1144
3
Y <
2288
729
< 17
3
(first inequality from Y < Y ∗ = 2
243
), thus i deviates. N
Weak kindness amplification
Why can kindness be sufficiently amplified to prevent deviation in Example
1 but not in Example 2(ii)? The answer concerns the size of the material
loss that the reciprocity payoff need compensate in the relevant subgames.
In Example 1, following a history of zero signatories, the material loss of
investing was 1. In Example 2(ii), following a history of 3 signatories, the
material loss to a signatory of not investing was 17
3
> 1. More generally,
for high β, the size of the material loss from not deviating in the relevant
subgame is lower for the case when there are zero signatories than when there
are many. Lower kindness is thus sufficient for non-deviation when there are
few signatories than when there are many.
To complete Example 2, part (iii) examines the remaining candidate SRE
(where all sign and invest on path) which involve all players investing when
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there are 3 signatories (by Examples 2(i)-(ii)). It shows that for a non-
signatory to invest when there are 3 signatories, a signatory must not invest
when there are 2 signatories. However, since this signatory has an incentive
to deviate to investing, these profiles are not SRE either.
Example 2(iii) (Non-signatory investing with 3 signatories): Take
Γ̂A and let n = 4, γ = 10, β = 9 and Y < Y
∗ = 2
243
. Consider a profile where
• all players sign & invest on path,
• all players invest at h where all but i have signed
By deviating to not investing at h, non-signatory i increases his material
payoff by 10 − 9 = 1. Whether i’s reciprocity incentives prevent deviation
depends on behaviour following histories with 2 signatories. If all invest
when there are 2 signatories, i’s incentives are identical to the full investment
profile in Γ̂P , thus i deviates at h (Y < Y
∗). If only the signatories invest
when there are 2 signatories, then i deviates at h if Y < 1
108
, which is true
(Y < Y ∗ = 2
243
< 1
108
). For i not to deviate at h, it must be that at least 3
players do not invest when there are 2 signatories.
Suppose then that some signatory j does not invest when there are 2
signatories. Signatory j has a material incentive to deviate to investing.
To maximise the reciprocity cost of this deviation, suppose no-one invests
if there are 2 signatories and all invest if there is 1 signatory. Signatory j
deviates to investing when there are 2 signatories if Y < 2
143
, which is true
(Y < Y ∗ = 2
243
< 2
143
). N
For the non-signatory to invest when there are 3 signatories his perceptions
of others’ kindness must be sufficiently amplified, this requires signatories to
not invest when there are 2 signatories. However, reciprocity incentives are
not sufficiently large to prevent a signatory deviating to investing for reasons
analogous to those discussed following Example 2(ii). Thus there does not
exist a full investment SRE where all sign on path.
To summarise, the fundamental intuition behind part (a) of Theorem 1
is the difficulty of amplifying kindness when many players sign. In order to
prevent sign-up stage deviation, kindness must be amplified, this requires low
investment in subgames where there are n− 1 or n− 2 (3 or 2 in Example 2)
signatories. However, signatories have relatively large material incentives to
invest in such subgames (high β) and reciprocity payoffs are relatively low
(Y < Y ∗), hence the impossibility.
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4 Further results
This section addresses three further questions. Does the impossibility of full
investment with n signatories arise in 2- and 3-player games? Can the agree-
ments mechanism give full investment when it is possible without a mecha-
nism (Y ≥ Y ∗)? When reciprocity is low (Y ∈ (0, Y ∗)) can the mechanism
deliver at least the investment levels possible under material preferences? We
show that the answers are no, yes and it depends.
Three- and two-player games
In contrast to Theorem 1(a), for 3-player games, the agreements mechanism
can give full investment with n signatories for an interval of Y less than Y ∗.9
Proposition 1 (3-players) For n = 3, all β and γ, there exists Y ′′ ∈
(0, Y ∗) such that,
(a) if Y ∈ [Y ′′, Y ∗) there exists a full investment SRE in Γ̂A with 3 sig-
natories. The SRE is described by 3 signing, then i does not invest iff
there is only 1 signatory.
(b) if Y ∈ [Y ′′, Y ∗) there exists a full investment SRE in Γ̂A with 0 sig-
natories. The SRE is described by 0 signing, then i does not invest iff
there is only 1 signatory.
The impossibility identified in Section 3 does not arise here as kindness can
be amplified more easily when n = 3. From Section 3, recall that a candidate
SRE where n sign and invest on path, required low investment in subgames
where there were n − 1 or n − 2 signatories (see Example 2(ii)-(iii)). Large
material incentives to invest in such subgames prevented low investment for
n > 3. By contrast, for n = 3, we get n− 2 = 1 signatory and players have
no material incentive to invest if there is only one signatory. Kindness can
thus be sufficiently amplified and all players signing and investing on path is
a SRE (Proposition 1(a)).
Now consider 2-player games. For such games, drop the assumptions that
γ
β
is non-integer and n >
⌈
γ
β
⌉
as they would contradict that nβ > γ > β > 0.10
9From now on, allow ΓA and ΓP to be 2- or 3-player games.
10Note that there exists a full investment SPE in the 2-player ΓA where both sign and
invest on path.
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Proposition 2 (2-players) For n = 2, all γ and Y ∈ (0, Y ∗),
(a) if β ≥ 2
3
γ, then there exists a full investment SRE in Γ̂A with 2 signa-
tories. The SRE is described by 2 signing, then i invests iff there are 2
signatories.
(b) for all β, there does not exist a full investment SRE in Γ̂A with 0
signatories.
In the 2-player agreements game, there exists a full investment SPE with 2
signatories. Kindness amplification is not needed to compensate players for
a material loss, thus impossibility does not occur (part (a)). By contrast,
full investment with zero signatories does require kindness amplification. As
part (b) suggests, kindness cannot be sufficiently amplified in the 2-player
game, this is because there is no other player, k, such that i can influence
k’s strategy and thereby amplify i’s influence over j’s material payoff.
High reciprocity (Y ≥ Y ∗)
Our main result examined cases where full investment was impossible with
no mechanism (Y ∈ (0, Y ∗)). We now consider whether the mechanism
precludes full investment when it was possible with no mechanism (Y ≥ Y ∗).
Proposition 3 (High reciprocity) For all n ≥ 2, γ, β and Y ≥ Y ∗ there
exists a full investment SRE in Γ̂A. The SRE is described by n signing, then
i does not invest iff there are
⌈
γ
β
⌉− q signatories where q > 0 and odd.
If full investment were possible without the mechanism, it remains possible
with it. As the reciprocity sensitivity is high (Y > Y ∗), when there are
many signatories (≥ ⌈γ
β
⌉
), reciprocity payoffs compensate material costs of
investment with no need for kindness amplification. When there are few
signatories (≤ ⌈γ
β
⌉
), the alternating between all investing and zero investing
ensures kindness is sufficiently amplified and that there are no deviations.
Low reciprocity (Y ∈ (0, Y ∗))
Observation 1(a) stated that full investment was impossible with material
preferences. Our results have thus far considered whether it is attainable
with reciprocity. We found that full investment is indeed attainable if the
reciprocity sensitivity is high enough (e.g. Theorem 1, Proposition 3). What
about when the reciprocity sensitivity is not sufficiently high? We know
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from Observation 1(c) that even with material preferences (i.e. Y = 0),
equilibria exist with
⌈
γ
β
⌉
players investing. Do equilibria exist with at least⌈
γ
β
⌉
players investing for small, non-zero reciprocity sensitivities? The answer
is often yes, however possibilities are complicated. We do not give a complete
characterisation, but offer a sufficient condition for games with many players.
Proposition 4 (Low reciprocity) For all n ≥ 7, γ and Y ∈ (0, Y ∗), there
exists β′′ ∈ (0, γ) and m′(Y ) ∈
[⌈
γ
β
⌉
, n
]
such that
(a) if β ≥ β′′ there exists a SRE where m′(Y ) players sign and invest on
path. The SRE is described by m′(Y ) players signing, then i invests iff
i signed and there are at least m′(Y ) signatories.
(b) m′(Y ) is non-decreasing in Y .
For n ≥ 7, even when the reciprocity sensitivity is low (Y ∈ (0, Y ∗)) at least
the maximal SPE investment,
⌈
γ
β
⌉
, is attainable as a SRE. As Y increases,
investment greater than
⌈
γ
β
⌉
is possible in SRE, since reciprocity payoffs in-
crease due to mutual kindness among signatories and kindness amplification.
5 Conclusion
We started this project because we felt that the economic situations described
by the agreements game were plentiful and important, and that reciprocity
motivation was realistic in those settings. If game form, utilities and solution
concepts make sense, so should the results. We were astonished when we
stumbled upon Theorem 1, which we found extremely surprising.
At first we were at loss for real-world examples that the result might
shed light on. But then two insights, both concerning the nature of relevant
observations to look for, dawned on us:
Insight #1: The dog that didn’t bark
Relevant non-agreement examples may easily be missed because they are
counterfactual. For example, consider a set of countries (e.g. China and
Malaysia, or Norway, Iceland and the UK) separated by a sea with a lim-
ited fish stock. A tragedy-of-the-commons over-fishing scenario may seem
ominous. What we call “investing” would be analogous to holding back on
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sending out trawlers. A co-financing agreement would involve compensating
neighbouring countries for their opportunity cost of catch they didn’t get.
Now, suppose such an agreement is not struck. Would you have noticed?
The answer may be yes, if there were lengthy negotiations that eventually
stranded, with upset politicians who cursed at each other during press con-
ferences. However, a no-one-signs outcome may also involve no drama at all.
It might be, that a co-financing agreement didn’t happen simply because
no one ever tried to move in that direction. For the analyst, it is, at first,
easy to overlook and not ever notice such non-agreements. But in fact, once
one starts thinking about them, one realises that deals-that-do-not-happen
happen all the time.
The UN, for example, offers an institutional setting where many agree-
ments could be struck, in principle, and, often, are not. The US and Russia
have not signed a co-financing agreement to rebuild Syria, for instance, and
their diplomats may have never raised the issue. It is easy to be critical of
that example: Is the situation really like a public good game? Well, maybe.
Is the outcome we see in Syria actually any good, as Theorem 1 would have
it? That may seem a stretch, but consider that the situation could conceiv-
ably have been considerably worse (e.g. World War III). Wary of over-reach,
we shall not over-state our case. And perhaps the fishing example is more
compelling than the Syria example. But we propose that in either case the
issue is thought-provoking and stimulating to consider.
Insight #2: Informal agreements
A weakness of Insight #1 is that non-deals that no-one ever moved towards
may not have been perceived by the parties supposed to play the game. That
would erode the applicability of our theory, which assumes that the parties
recognise that they interact in a public good game form, where a co-financing
agreement is a real possibility even when shunned. Our second insight avoids
this weakness:
Namely, a no-one signs outcome may follow neither a stranded negotia-
tion nor a no-one-did-anything scenario. Rather, the outcome may have been
quite actively and harmoniously reached, with a co-financing agreement be-
ing explicitly rejected while some other informal and non-binding agreement
(corresponding to full investment without co-financing) were reached. As a
possible example, take the 2015 UN Climate Change Conference in Paris (aka
COP21/CMP11). Many commentators have pointed out that the agreement
is not binding, in the sense that there are no penalties for non-compliance
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(e.g. Cle´menc¸on (2016), Jacquet and Jamieson (2016)). Arguably, negotia-
tors could have made a binding, or formal, commitment to co-finance each
other’s efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but instead they struck
a non-binding, or informal, agreement to exert such effort anyway, without
co-financing mandates (at least between industrial countries). This may be
an outcome along the lines that our Theorem 1 points to. Agents do not
sign a formal co-financing agreement, but rather reject the agreement and
coordinate on full investment nonetheless. The “soft-touch” Paris agreement
is then a much needed coordination device to ensure that investments in
climate change are made. On this interpretation, Theorem 1 is less about
non-deals, and more about allowing certain informal deals to gain traction
as other formal deals are shunned. And institutions that allow formal agree-
ments for co-financing to be signed, even when they are not, are critical for
spurring informal agreements to invest in public goods.11
Time will tell whether the climate is in good hands following the Paris
agreement. According to our model, under the interpretation given here,
there are some intriguing reasons to be optimistic.
Insights #1 and #2 highlight a general lesson: Institutions that offer op-
portunities for binding agreements may be important even if such agreements
are not struck. In our case, creating the possibility of a formal co-financing
agreement may promote actual investment in public goods, and yet no co-
financing agreement is signed.
11Environmental economist Michael Greenstone (2015; online NYT article) recently ar-
gued that international treaties (and in particular the Paris one) have to be voluntary and
such that individual countries find compliance in their interest. The insights of our Theo-
rem 1 may be seen to complement his view, endogenising the nature of said agreement and
providing an account for the forces (viz. reciprocity) that ensure incentive compatibility.
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Appendix
Proof of Observation 1 (Agreements game SPE)
Apply backward induction to identify the SPE of ΓA. At h = a
1, non-
signatories do not invest and signatory i invests iff β ≥ γ
m(a1)
. Since γ
β
non-
integer, write the condition as iff m (a1) ≥ ⌈γ
β
⌉
. Given optimal behaviour
at all a1, consider the first-stage. First suppose there are less than
⌈
γ
β
⌉ − 1
signatories. Player i does not deviate in the first-stage as pii (.) = 0 regardless.
Thus this is a SPE. Second suppose there are
⌈
γ
β
⌉ − 1 signatories. Non-
signatory i deviates to signing if 0 < β
⌈
γ
β
⌉ − γ, which is true. Thus this is
not a SPE. Third suppose there are
⌈
γ
β
⌉
signatories. Signatory i does not
deviate to not signing if d γ
β
eβ − γ ≥ 0, which is true. Non-signatory i does
not deviate to signing if d γ
β
eβ ≥ (⌈γ
β
⌉
+ 1)β− γ, which is also true. Thus this
is a SPE. Fourth suppose there are more than
⌈
γ
β
⌉
signatories. Signatory i
deviates to not signing as other players invest regardless of his choice. Thus
this is not a SPE. The four cases are exhaustive. 
Proof of Theorem 1
(a) Take the set of strategy profiles that involve n players signing and in-
vesting on path. Partition this set into 3 subsets of profiles distinguished
by behaviour following a history of a1 such that m (a1) = n − 1: subset 1,
all invest; subset 2, all signatories invest only; and subset 3, all remaining
profiles. We take each subset in turn and demonstrate that no profile in the
subset is a SRE if β is sufficiently high and Y < Y ∗.
Subset 1: Consider any candidate SRE profile s∗ such that each i ∈ N
signs, then invests if a1 is such that m (a1) ≥ n − 1. Reason as follows to
show that there is no behaviour at histories such that m (a1) < n − 1 that
would imply s∗ is a SRE.
Consider h = a1 such that m (a1) = n − 1, so all players invest. Non-
signatory i has the same material incentive to deviate to not investing as
in ΓP . Given Y < Y
∗, a necessary condition for i not to deviate is that
λiji
(
s∗j , .
)
> β
2
(recall λiji (1, .) =
β
2
in Γ̂P ). The value of λiji
(
s∗j , .
)
at h,
depends on the action choices s∗ prescribes at history h′ where all except i
and j sign. If s∗ were such that n invest or all except j invest at h′, then
λiji
(
s∗j , .
)
= nβ − γ − 1
2
(nβ − γ + (n− 1) β − γ) = β
2
at h, thus i would
19
deviate at h. If s∗ were such that all except i invest or all except i and j
invest at h′, then λiji
(
s∗j , .
)
= nβ−γ− 1
2
((n− 1) β + (n− 2) β) = 3
2
β−γ < β
2
,
thus i would deviate at h. Therefore a necessary condition for i to not deviate
at h, is that s∗ must be such that some signatory l does not invest at h′.
Consider h′ and suppose s∗ prescribes signatory l does not invest. Sig-
natory l has a material incentive to deviate to invest at h′. We now show
that for β sufficiently high and all Y < Y ∗, l’s reciprocity incentives are in-
sufficient to prevent deviation at h′. The change in signatory l’s reciprocity
payoff from playing s∗l rather than s
′
l (h
′, s∗l ) equals YΨ, where
Ψ :=
∑
k∈N\{l}
(κlk (s
∗
l , .)− κlk (s′l (h′, s∗l ) , .))λlkl (s∗k, .) .
If Ψ ≤ 0, then l deviates at h′. Suppose Ψ > 0. Signatory l does not deviate
at h′ if
Y ≥ (n− 2) β − γ
(n− 2) Ψ . (3)
Let Ŷ (β) denote the RHS of (3) as a function of β. For Y < Y ∗ we require
Ŷ (β) =
(n− 2) β − γ
(n− 2) Ψ <
2 (γ − β)
β2 (n− 1) = Y
∗.
Now argue that for sufficiently high β either Y < Y ∗ does not hold or l has an
incentive to deviate at h′. Note that limβ→γ Y ∗ = 0. Therefore for β in the
neighbourhood of γ, Y < Y ∗ requires limβ→γ Ŷ (β) ≤ 0. Evaluating Ŷ (γ),
note that the numerator of Ŷ (γ) is positive thus it must be that Ψ ≤ 0.
However if Ψ < 0 then l would deviate at h′ for β slightly lower than γ
as already argued, thus Ψ = 0 when β = γ. That we have supposed that
Ψ > 0 for sufficiently high β and deduced Ψ = 0 at β = γ, implies that the
denominator of Ŷ (β) approaches zero from above and hence the one-sided
limit limβ→γ− Ŷ (β) = +∞ which is greater than limβ→γ Y ∗ = 0, violating
Y < Y ∗. Thus for all Y < Y ∗ and β sufficiently high, l would deviate to
investing at h′.
Subset 2: Consider a candidate SRE profile s∗ such that each i ∈ N
signs, then invests if a1 is such that m (a1) = n, and if a1 is such that
m (a1) = n − 1, all except the non-signatory invest. At the initial node, i’s
incentives are identical to those in the full investment profile in Γ̂P . Thus i
deviates to not signing at the initial node for all Y < Y ∗. Hence s∗ is not a
SRE.
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Subset 3 : Consider any remaining candidate SRE profile s∗ such that
each i ∈ N signs, then invests if a1 is such that m (a1) = n, it must be that
for history h′′ = a1 such that m (a1) = n − 1, there exists some signatory r
who does not invest. Reasoning analogous to that used to show signatory
l deviates to investing at h′ (end of subset 1) establishes that signatory r
deviates to investing at h′′. Hence s∗ is not a SRE.
(b) Consider s∗ such that each i ∈ N does not sign, then invests if a1 is such
that m (a1) = 0 or a1i = 1 and m (a
1) ≥ 2, and does not invest otherwise.
We demonstrate that there exists Y ′′ < Y ∗ such that no player deviates at
any h if Y ∈ [Y ′′, Y ∗) and β is sufficiently large.
First consider h = a1 such that m (a1) = 0. Player i has a material
incentive to deviate to not investing and a reciprocity incentive to not do so.
His increase in reciprocity payoff from playing s∗i instead of s
′
i (h, s
∗
i ) is(
n−m(a1)− 1) · Y · (κij (s∗i , .)− κij (s′i (h, s∗i ) , .)) · λiji (s∗j , .)
+m(a1) · Y · (κil (s∗i , .)− κil (s′i (h, s∗i ) , .)) · λili (s∗l , .) , (4)
where j is a non-signatory and l a signatory. Since κij (s
∗
i , .) = λiji
(
s∗j , .
)
=
1
2
(nβ − γ) and κij (s′i (h, s∗i )) = 12 (nβ − γ) − β, this increase in reciprocity
payoff is larger than the reduction in material payoff if Y ≥ Φ, where
Φ :=
2 (γ − β)
(n− 1) β (nβ − γ) .
Note that if β > γ
n−1 , then Φ < Y
∗. Thus i does not deviate for Y ∈ [Φ, Y ∗).
Now consider h = a1 such that m (a1) > 0. No player has a material
incentive to deviate at a1 since for β > γ
2
, d γ
β
e = 2, thus action choices
following all a1 are identical to SPE profiles. We will demonstrate for suffi-
ciently high β and Y (but less than Y ∗), any reciprocity incentive to deviate
is less than the material incentive to not do so.
At h = a1 such that m (a1) = 1, player i has no reciprocity incentive to
deviate to investing, thus does not deviate. At h = a1 such that m (a1) = 2,
the change in signatory i’s reciprocity payoff from playing s∗i rather than
s′i (h, s
∗
i ) is(
n−m(a1)) · Y · (κij (s∗i , .)− κij (s′i (h, s∗i ) , .)) · λiji (s∗j , .)
+
(
m(a1)− 1) · Y · (κil (s∗i , .)− κil (s′i (h, s∗i ) , .)) · λili (s∗l , .) , (5)
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where j is a non-signatory and l a signatory. For non-signatory j, κij (s
∗
i , .) =
β , κij (s
′
i (h, s
∗
i ) , .) = 0 and λiji
(
s∗j , .
)
= −β
2
. For signatory l, κil (s
∗
i , .) =
3
2
β−γ, κil (s′i (h, s∗i ) , .) = 12 (β − γ) and λili (s∗l , .) = 32β−γ. Substituting into
(5) gives Y
((
β − γ
2
)
(3
2
β − γ)− (n− 2)β2
2
)
, which is negative for sufficiently
large β. Signatory i’s reciprocity incentive to deviate to not investing at h is
no larger than the material incentive to not do so if
Y ≤
[ γ
2
− β(
β − γ
2
) (
3
2
β − γ)− (n− 2)β2
2
]
.
For β sufficiently large, there exists Y satisfying the inequality and that
Y ≥ Φ (as limβ→γ [.] > 0 and limβ→γ Φ = 0).
Using (4), non-signatory i’s change in reciprocity payoff from playing s∗i
rather than s′i (h, s
∗
i ) is
1
2
Y β2 (n− 7). This is non-negative for n ≥ 7, thus i
does not deviate at h. For n ∈ [4, 6], i does not deviate at h if Y ≤ 2(γ−β)
β2(7−n) .
There exists Y satisfying the inequality and that Y ≥ Φ, since the RHS of
this inequality is greater than Φ if (n2 − 7) β + (1− n) γ > 0, which holds
given n ≥ 4.
Consider h = a1 such that m (a1) ∈ [3, n− 1]. Using (5), signatory i’s
change in reciprocity payoff from playing s∗i rather than s
′
i (h, s
∗
i ) is Y Ξ where
Ξ :=
(
m
(
a1
)− 1)(β − γ
m (a1)
)
β
2
− (n−m (a1)) β2
2
.
If Ξ ≥ 0, then i has no reciprocity incentive to deviate at h. Suppose Ξ < 0,
then i does not deviate if Y ≤
[
γ−βm(a1)
Ξm(a1)
]
. For β sufficiently large, there exists
Y satisfying the inequality and that Y ≥ Φ (as limβ→γ [.] > 0 > limβ→γ Φ =
0).
Non-signatory i’s change in reciprocity payoff from playing s∗i rather than
s′i (h, s
∗
i ) is
1
2
Y β2 (n− 2m (a1)− 1) (use (4)). If n − 2m (a1) − 1 ≥ 0, then
1
2
Y β2 (n− 2m (a1)− 1) ≥ 0, thus i has no reciprocity incentive to deviate at
h. If n− 2m (a1)− 1 < 0, then i does not deviate at h if
Y ≤ 2 (γ − β)
β2 (2m (a1) + 1− n) .
The RHS is strictly greater than Φ if (n2 − 2m (a1)− 1) β + (1− n) γ > 0
which is true as β tends to γ.
Finally, at h = a1 such that m (a1) = n and the initial node, player i has
neither material nor reciprocity incentives to deviate. 
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Proof of Proposition 1 (3-players)
(a) Let n = 3. Consider s∗ such that each i ∈ N signs, then does not invest
if a1 is such that m (a1) = 1 and does invest otherwise. Reason as follows
to verify the profile is SRE for an interval of Y less than Y ∗. Consider
h = a1 such that m (a1) = 3, so all invest. Signatory i has neither material
nor reciprocity incentive to deviate to not investing. Now consider h = a1
such that m(a1) = 2, so all invest. Signatory i has neither a material nor
a reciprocity incentive to deviate to not investing at h. Non-signatory i
has a material incentive to deviate to not investing at h and a reciprocity
incentive to not do so. Reason as follows to identify Y such that i does
not deviate. Using (4), non-signatory i’s increase in reciprocity payoff from
playing s∗i rather than s
′
i (h, s
∗
i ) is no less than his reduction in material payoff
if Y ≥ Y ′′(β, γ), where
Y ′′(β, γ) :=
γ − β
β(3β − γ) .
Note that Y ′′(β, γ) ≥ Y ∗ iff γ
β
+ 1 > 3, however given d γ
β
e < n = 3, then
Y ′′(β, γ) < Y ∗. Thus i does not deviate at h if Y ∈ (Y ′′ , Y ∗). Now consider
h = a1 such that m(a1) = 1, so zero invest. Player i has neither a material
nor a reciprocity incentive to deviate to investing. Then consider h = a1
such that m (a1) = 0, so all players invest. Non-signatory i, faces identical
incentives as a non-signatory at a history with 2 signatories, i does not deviate
at h if Y ∈ (Y ′′ , Y ∗). Finally, at the initial node, i has neither reciprocity
nor material incentives to deviate.
(b) Let n = 3. Consider s∗ such that each i ∈ N does not sign, then does
not invest if a1 is such that m (a1) = 1 and does invest otherwise. Reason as
follows to verify the profile is SRE for an interval of Y less than Y ∗. Stage
2 behaviour is optimal (part (a) of this proof). At the initial node, i has
neither reciprocity nor material incentives to deviate. 
Proof of Proposition 2 (2-players)
(a) Let n = 2. Consider s∗ such that each i ∈ N signs, then invests iff a1
is such that m(a1) = 1. Note that i has no material incentive to deviate at
any history. Furthermore if β ≥ 2
3
γ, i has no reciprocity incentive to deviate
either.
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(b) Let n = 2. Consider any s∗ such that each i ∈ N does not sign, then
invests on path. Consider h = a1 such that m(a1) = 0, so all invest. Non-
signatory i has a material incentive to deviate to not investing. Non-signatory
i’s increase in reciprocity payoff from playing s∗i rather than s
′
i (h, s
∗
i ) is (4).
We now demonstrate that this increase is reciprocity payoff is not sufficient
to prevent deviation for Y < Y ∗. Consider the following 4 exhaustive cases.
Case (i): s∗ is such that j does not invest if only i signs and i does
not invest if only j signs. Note that (4) is no less than the reduction in i’s
material payoff from playing s∗i rather than s
′
i (h, s
∗
i ) iff Y >
2(γ−β)
β(2β−γ) . However
the RHS is less than Y ∗ iff β > γ, which is false.
Case (ii): s∗ is such that j does not invest if only i signs and i does invest
if only j signs. Note that (4) is no less than the reduction in i’s material
payoff from playing s∗i rather than s
′
i (h, s
∗
i ) iff Y ≥ Y ∗, which is false.
Case (iii): s∗ is such that j does invest if only i signs and i does not invest
if only j signs. Note that (4) is no less than the reduction in i’s material
payoff from playing s∗i rather than s
′
i (h, s
∗
i ) iff Y >
2(γ−β)
β(2β−γ) . However the
RHS is less than Y ∗ iff β > γ, which is false.
Case (iv): s∗ is such that j does invest if only i signs, i does invest if
only j signs. Note that (4) is no less than the reduction in i’s material payoff
from playing s∗i rather than s
′
i (h, s
∗
i ) iff Y ≥ Y ∗, which is false.
Thus i deviates at h. 
Proof of Proposition 3 (High reciprocity)
We demonstrate that a particular profile implying full investment, s∗, is a
SRE of Γ̂A for all Y ≥ Y ∗. Consider s∗ such that each i ∈ N signs, then does
not invest if a1 is such that m (a1) =
⌈
γ
β
⌉− q where q > 0 and odd, and does
invest otherwise. Reason as follows to confirm that for all Y ≥ Y ∗, players
have no incentive to deviate at any history.
Consider h = a1 such that m (a1) ∈ (⌈γ
β
⌉
, n]. Signatory i has neither a
material nor a reciprocity incentive to deviate to not investing at h. Non-
signatory i faces identical incentives to the full investment profile in Γ̂P , thus
i does not deviate to not investing at h if Y ≥ Y ∗.
Now consider h = a1 such that m (a1) =
⌈
γ
β
⌉
. Signatory i has neither a
material nor a reciprocity incentive to deviate to not investing at h. Non-
signatory i has a material incentive to deviate to not investing at h and a
reciprocity incentive to not do so. Reason as follows to identify Y such that i
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does not deviate. Non-signatory i’s increase in reciprocity payoff from playing
s∗i rather than s
′
i (h, s
∗
i ) is (4). This is no less than the reduction in i ’s ma-
terial payoff from playing s∗i rather than s
′
i (h, s
∗
i ) if Y ≥ Y (n, β, γ,m (a1)),
where
Y
(
n, β, γ,m
(
a1
))
:=
2 (γ − β)
β ((nβ − γ − β)m (a1) + (n− 1) β) .
Note that Y (n, β, γ,m (a1)) ≥ Y ∗ iff γ
β
+ 1 ≥ n, however by assumption⌈
γ
β
⌉
< n, therefore Y (n, β, γ,m (a1)) < Y ∗. Thus Y ≥ Y ∗ is sufficient to
prevent non-signatory i deviating at h.
Now consider h = a1 such that m (a1) =
⌈
γ
β
⌉ − q where q > 0 and even,
so all players invest. Non-signatory i, faces identical incentives as a non-
signatory at a history with
⌈
γ
β
⌉
signatories, thus i does not deviate to not
investing if Y ≥ Y (n, β, γ,m (a1)), which holds for Y ≥ Y ∗.
Signatory i has a material incentive to deviate to not investing. Using
(5), signatory i’s change in reciprocity payoff from playing s∗i rather than
s′i (h, s
∗
i ) is strictly positive iff
Y Ω
2
> 0 where
Ω :=
(
m
(
a1
)− 1)(β − γ
m (a1)
)
∆λS +
(
n−m (a1)) β∆λN ,
∆λS := (n+ 1) β − m(a1)+1m(a1) γ and ∆λN := (n− 1) β − m(a
1)
m(a1)+1
γ. Note that
∆λS < ∆λN . To determine the sign of Ω reason as follows. Clearly m (a
1)−
1 > 0 , β − γ
m(a1)
< 0 and n − m (a1) > 0, thus we need only sign ∆λS
and ∆λN . Given n >
⌈
γ
β
⌉
, it follows that (n− 1) β > γ, which implies that
∆λN > 0. Consider how ∆λS influences the sign of Ω. If ∆λS ≤ 0, then
Ω > 0. If ∆λS > 0, since ∆λS < ∆λN we can write
Ω >
((
m
(
a1
)− 1)(β − γ
m (a1)
)
+
(
n−m (a1)) β)∆λS > 0.
where the final inequality follows from (m (a1)− 1) (β− γ
m(a1)
)+(n−m (a1)) β >
∆λN > 0. Therefore Ω > 0 and signatory i’s reciprocity payoff is strictly
higher playing s∗i instead of s
′
i (h, s
∗
i ). This increase in reciprocity payoff is no
less than i’s reduction in material payoff from playing s∗i rather than s
′
i (h, s
∗
i )
if Y ≥ Ŷ (n, β, γ,m (a1)) where
Ŷ
(
n, β, γ,m
(
a1
))
:=
2 (γ/m (a1)− β)
Ω
.
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Now argue that Ŷ (n, β, γ,m (a1)) < Y ∗. To do so, take a function, Y˜ (n, β, γ,m (a1)),
such that Y˜ (n, β, γ,m (a1)) > Ŷ (n, β, γ,m (a1)). To identify an appropriate
function, reason as follows. For a given ∆λN , Ω is decreasing in ∆λS, and
∆λS is bounded by ∆λN , thus let ∆λS = ∆λN to minimise Ω. Furthermore,
note that Ω is increasing in ∆λN , and that ∆λN is strictly greater than β. To
see this, note that βn−γ > β since n > γ
β
+1 by assumption. Also note that
γ
m(a1)+1
− β > 0 for all m (a1) ∈ {1, . . . , ⌈γ
β
⌉− 2}. Putting this together gives
∆λN > β. Overall then, substitute ∆λS = ∆λN = β into Ŷ (n, β, γ,m (a
1))
to give
Y˜
(
n, β, γ,m
(
a1
))
:=
2( γ
m(a1)
− β)
β((n− 1)β − m(a1)−1
m(a1)
γ)
.
Suppose that Y˜ (n, β, γ,m (a1)) > Y ∗. This requires
(γ − β)
(
(n− 1) β − m(a
1)− 1
m(a1)
γ
)
<
(
γ
m(a1)
− β
)
β (n− 1) .
Note that the LHS is increasing in m (a1) and that the RHS is decreasing in
m (a1). Substitutingm (a1) = 1 gives (γ − β) (n− 1) β < (γ − β) (n− 1) β, a
contradiction. Therefore Y˜ (n, β, γ,m (a1)) ≤ Y ∗. Overall, Y ∗ ≥ Y˜ (n, β, γ,m (a1)) >
Ŷ (n, β, γ,m (a1)), thus Y ≥ Y ∗ is sufficient to prevent signatory i deviating
from s∗i to s
′
i (h, s
∗
i ) at h.
Now consider h = a1 such that m (a1) =
⌈
γ
β
⌉ − q where q > 1 and odd,
so zero players invest. Non-signatory i has neither material nor reciprocity
incentives to deviate to investing at h. Signatory i has no material incentive
to deviate to investing at h. Using (5), the change in signatory i’s reciprocity
payoff from playing s∗i rather than s
′
i (h, s
∗
i ) is Y Ω/2, which is strictly positive
as already established, thus i does not deviate at h.
Now consider h = a1 such that m (a1) =
⌈
γ
β
⌉ − 1, so zero invest. Non-
signatory i has neither a material nor a reciprocity incentive to deviate to
investing. Signatory i has no material incentive to deviate to investing. Using
(5), the change in signatory i’s reciprocity payoff from playing s∗i rather than
s′i (h, s
∗
i ) is
Y
2
(Ω + (n−m (a1)) β (β − γ/ (m (a1) + 1))), which is strictly pos-
itive as we know Ω > 0 and that γ
β
< m (a1) + 1, implies β−γ
m(a1)+1
> 0, thus i
does not deviate at h.
Now consider h = a1 such that m (a1) = 0, so zero invest for
⌈
γ
β
⌉
odd and
n invest otherwise. For
⌈
γ
β
⌉
odd, player i has neither material nor reciprocity
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incentives to deviate to investing. For
⌈
γ
β
⌉
even, player i faces identical in-
centives as a non-signatory following a history of
⌈
γ
β
⌉
signatories, thus does
not deviate if Y ≥ Y (n, β, γ,m (a1)), which is satisfied for all Y ≥ Y ∗.
Finally consider the initial node. Player i has neither material nor reci-
procity incentives to deviate. Hence s∗ is a SRE. 
Proof of Proposition 4 (Low reciprocity)
(a) Consider s∗ such that m (Y ) sign, then i invests iff i signed and there
are at least m(Y ) signatories. For β sufficiently high, we first identify non-
deviation conditions for signatories in the investment stage, then do the same
for non-signatories, and then consider the sign-up stage. Using these condi-
tions, we show that for all Y ∈ (0, Y ∗), some s∗ is a SRE.
Consider h = a1 such that m(a1) > m(Y ). Signatory i has no material
incentive to deviate to not investing. Using (5), the change in i’s reciprocity
payoff from playing s∗i rather than s
′
i (h, s
∗
i ) is
Y
β
2
[
(β − γ
m(a1)
)(m(a1)− 1)− β(n−m(a1))
]
. (6)
Note that if m(a1) = γ
β
then (6) < 0, if m(a1) = n then (6) > 0 and that
(6) is strictly increasing in m(a1). There must then exist some m˜ ∈ ( γ
β
, n)
such that if m(a1) = m˜ then (6) = 0. For m(a1) ≥ m˜, signatory i does not
deviate at h. For m(a1) ∈ [m(Y ) + 1, m˜), signatory i does not deviate to not
investing at h if Y ≤ Y1(m(a1)), where
Y1(m(a
1)) ≡
β − γ
m(a1)
−β
2
[
(β − γ
m(a1)
)(m(a1)− 1)− β(n−m(a1))
] .
As Y (m(a1)) is strictly increasing in m(a1), Y ≤ Y1(m(Y ) + 1) is a sufficient
condition for signatory i to not deviate to not investing at h.
Consider h = a1 such that m(a1) = m(Y ). Signatory i has a material in-
centive to not deviate to not investing. Using (5), the change in i’s reciprocity
incentive from playing s∗i rather than s
′
i (h, s
∗
i ) is
f(m(a1)) ≡
{
(β − γ
m(a1)
)m(a
1)β−γ
2
(m(a1)− 1)− β2
2
(n−m(a1)) if m(a1) ≥ 3,
(β − γ
m(a1)
)(m(a1)β − β
2
− γ)(m(a1)− 1)− β2
2
(n−m(a1)) if m(a1) = 2.
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Note that f(m(a1)) is strictly increasing in m(a1). If f(m(a1)) ≥ 0, signatory
i does not deviate to not investing at h. If f(m(a1)) < 0, signatory i does
not deviate to not investing at h if Y ≤ Y2(m(a1)), where
Y2(m(a
1)) ≡
β − γ
m(a1)
−f(m(a1)) .
If m(Y ) ≥ 3, then for m(a1) ≥ m(Y ), signatory i does not deviate to not
investing if Y ≤ min{Y1(m(Y ) + 1), Y2(m(Y )}. This can be rewritten as
Y ≤ Y1(m(Y )) since for m(a1) ≥ 3, Y1(m(a1)) < Y2(m(a1)) and both are
strictly increasing in m(a1). If m(Y ) = 2, then for m(a1) ≥ 2, signatory
i does not deviate to not investing if Y ≤ Y2(m(Y )) (since Y2(m(a1)) <
Y1(m(a
1)) < Y1(m(a
1) + 1)).
Consider h = a1 such that m(a1) = m(Y ) − 1 ≥ 2. Signatory i has
a material incentive to deviate to investing. Using (5), the change in i’s
reciprocity payoff from playing s∗i rather than s
′
i (h, s
∗
i ) is
Y
β
2
[
(n−m(a1))((m(a1) + 1)β − γ)− (m(a1)− 1)( γ
m(a1)
− β)
]
. (7)
Note that (7) > 0. Thus signatory i does not deviate to not investing at h if
Y ≥ Y3(m(a1)), where
Y3(m(a
1)) ≡
β − γ
m(a1)
β
2
[
(n−m(a1))((m(a1) + 1)β − γ)− (m(a1)− 1)( γ
m(a1)
− β)
] .
Consider h = a1 such that m(a1) ∈ [2,m(Y )−1). Signatory i has a mate-
rial incentive to deviate to investing. Using (5), the change in i’s reciprocity
payoff from playing s∗i rather than s
′
i (h, s
∗
i ) is
Y
β
2
[
(n−m(a1))β − (m(a1)− 1)( γ
m(a1)
− β)
]
. (8)
Note that (8) > 0. Thus signatory i does not deviate to not investing at h if
Y ≥ Y4(m(a1)), where
Y4(m(a
1)) ≡ β − γ/m(a
1)
β
2
[
(n−m(a1))β − (m(a1)− 1)( γ
m(a1)
− β)
] .
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Since Y4(.) is increasing in m(a
1), for all m(a1) ∈ [2,m(Y )− 1), signatory i
does not deviate if Y ≥ Y4(m(Y )− 2).
Consider h = a1 such that m(a1) = 1. Signatory i has no material
incentive to deviate to investing. Using (5), the change in i’s reciprocity
payoff from playing s∗i rather than s
′
i (h, s
∗
i ) is Y
β2
2
(n− 1) > 0, thus i has no
reciprocity incentive to deviate either. Finally, Consider h = a1 such that
m(a1 ) ∈ {0, 1}, i has neither material nor reciprocity incentive to deviate to
investing.
Now consider non-signatories. Clearly non-signatory i has no material
incentive to invest. For all h = a1 such that m(a1) /∈ {m(Y )−1,m(Y )}, non-
signatory i perceives others as no more kind than in the full investment profile
in Γ̂P , thus does not deviate to investing for Y < Y
∗. For h = a1 such that
m(a1) = m(Y )− 1, all other players are unkind to i so he has no reciprocity
incentive to deviate to investing. For h = a1 such that m(a1) = m(Y ),
using (4), non-signatory i’s reciprocity incentive from deviating to investing
is β
2
2
(n− (m(a1))2 −m(a1)− 1), which is non-negative if n ≥ 7.
Now consider the sign-up stage. Signatory i has identical incentives to a
signatory’s incentives at h = a1 such that m(a1) = m(Y ). Non-signatory i
has identical incentives to a non-signatory’s incentives at h = a1 such that
m(a1) = m(Y ). Thus if players have no incentive to deviate in the investment
stage, they also have no incentive to deviate in the sign-up stage.
In sum, there exists a SRE where m(Y ) = 2 if Y ∈ I2 ≡ {Y : Y <
Y2(m(Y ))}; m(Y ) = 3 if Y ∈ I3 ≡ {Y : Y ∈ [Y3(m(Y ) − 1), Y1(m(Y ))]};
m(Y ) ∈ [4, m˜) if Y ∈ I[4,m˜) ≡ {Y : Y ∈ [Y4(m(Y ) − 1), Y1(m(Y ))]} and
m(Y ) ≥ m˜ if Y ∈ I≥m˜ ≡ {Y : Y ≥ Y4(m(Y ) − 1)}. To show that there
exists a SRE for all Y ∈ (0, Y ∗), verify that I2 ∪ I3 ∪ I[4,m˜) ∪ I≥m˜ covers
R+ as follows. First, I2 ∩ I3 6= ∅ as Y3(m(Y ) − 1) < Y2(m(Y ) − 1) <
Y2(m(Y )). Second, I3 6= ∅ since Y3(m(Y )− 1) < Y1(m(Y )− 1) < Y1(m(Y )).
Third, since Y4(m(Y )) < Y1(m(Y )) and both increase in m(Y ), it holds that
Y4(m(Y ) − 1) < Y4(m(Y )) < Y1(m(Y )) < Y1(m(Y ) + 1). Therefore the
intersections for the intervals for all m(Y ) ≥ 3 are also non-empty.
(b) See final paragraph of part (a) of this proof. 
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